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 Asset Prices, the Real Exchange Rate, and Unemployment in a Small 
Open Economy: A Medium-Run Structuralist Perspective 
 
By Hian Teck Hoon and Edmund S. Phelps* 
 
Introduction 
The second half of the nineties saw a number of industrial economies experiencing a 
steady decline in the rate of unemployment and real exchange rate appreciation together 
with a stock market boom, brought about by anticipation of higher productivity fueling an 
increased future need for capital, unaccompanied by rising inflation (Phelps and Zoega, 
2001). How well does the open-economy Keynesian model (Mundell, 1962, 1963) 
explain this phenomenon? In the small open economy version of this model with a given 
external real rate of interest under freely fluctuating exchange rates and perfect 
international capital mobility, the stock market boom increases both investment and 
consumer spending, thus aggregate demand. The expanded demand, however, puts an 
upward pressure on the domestic interest rate, which leads to a massive inflow of capital 
and consequently a real exchange rate appreciation. The result is that export demand is 
fully crowded out so as to leave output and employment unchanged. In a large open 
economy, the increased aggregate demand pushes up the world interest rate so that the 
higher velocity of money pulls up domestic output and employment (above the natural 
level), creating inflationary pressures. 
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 In this paper (as well as in Hoon and Phelps, 2001), we explore non-monetary channels 
through which the rise in asset prices and the accompanying real exchange rate 
appreciation produce shifts in the natural rate path, even in a small open economy where 
the external real rate of interest is unaffected by the shock under study. In our earlier 
paper, we studied a customer market model where the underlying domestic asset is the 
firm’s stock of customers, and the Law of One Price fails because of imperfect 
information regarding prices of similar or identical goods overseas. With the valuation of 
an additional customer increased due to an anticipated future step-increase in the level of 
productivity, firms are willing to reduce their current mark-ups. With the price reduced as 
a ratio to unit cost, each firm’s real demand wage is increased accordingly, so 
employment is expanded. Moreover, with domestic firms facing an internationally more 
competitive environment, they are induced to reduce their markups even further so as to 
prevent the erosion of their customer base to foreign suppliers. Overall, employment 
expands without producing inflationary pressures. 
 
Here, we shall explore a different, yet complementary, channel through which a rise in 
asset prices and real exchange rate appreciation lead to an expansion of employment 
without raising inflation. The failure of the Law of One Price is due to the Balassa-
Harrod-Samuleson assumption of a non-tradable sector, which we treat as the capital-
goods producing sector, lying alongside the tradable sector. Following the empirical 
literature (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996), we suppose that the non-traded good sector is 
relatively labor intensive. When the stock market boom occurs, there is an increased 
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demand for investment goods. However, the presence of external costs of adjustment, 
which we model by introducing the classic two-sector structure, means that there is an 
upward-sloping supply curve of capital good. (Goolsbee, 1997, presents empirical 
evidence in support of the existence of a positively-sloped supply curve of capital goods. 
He finds that a 10 percent investment tax credit increases equipment prices 3.5 to 7.0 
percent. This lasts several years and is largest for assets with large order backlogs or low 
import competition. Capital goods workers’ wages rise, too.) The increased demand for 
the investment good is, therefore, not fully met by increased supply, prompting a rise in 
the relative price of the non-traded capital good, and hence a real exchange rate 
appreciation. As the investment good sector is also the relatively labor-intensive one, 
there is an implied rise in the real demand wage, and a decline in equilibrium 
unemployment. 
            
Our model can also be applied to study other shocks. A particularly striking example of 
the distinctive mechanism that we emphasize comes from contrasting our model’s 
prediction about the effects of a rise in the external rate of interest to the prediction of the 
Mundell-Fleming model. Blanchard, in commenting on Fitoussi, Jestaz, Phelps and 
Zoega (2000), stresses that there has been a convergence in the views of a large number 
of economists regarding the common set of economic shocks that produced the great 
slump of Europe. In particular, it is now widely accepted that a rise in the world real 
interest rate in the eighties has contributed to a rise in European unemployment. Yet, 
according to the Mundell-Fleming model, an increase in the external real interest rate 
leads to a real exchange rate depreciation for the small open economy, thus stimulating 
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export demand and hence expanding output and employment. (As a matter of fact, the 
neoclassical theory of business cycle fluctuations that relies on the intertemporal 
substitution of leisure mechanism to explain employment fluctuations would also predict 
that a rise in the external real rate of interest is expansionary. See Faria and Leόn-
Ledesma, 2000.) In our present model, the rise in the external real interest rate causes a 
fall in asset prices as managers apply a higher discount rate to evaluate the stream of 
prospective profits. The implied decline in investment spending leads to a movement 
down the capital-goods supply curve, with a consequent fall in the relative price of 
capital, a real exchange rate depreciation, and a decrease in the real demand wage. Given 
the wage curve, equilibrium employment declines. 
 
Another shock we study in this paper is the adoption of investment tax credits, such as 
under Ronald Reagan in the first half of the eighties. We show that in our model 
economy, investment subsidies act to raise the relative price of capital, produce a real 
exchange rate appreciation, and both increase wages as well as expand equilibrium 
employment. In the rest of the paper, we first develop the basic model, and then apply it 
to study the anticipation of a future step-level increase in productivity, an increase in the 
external real rate of interest, and an introduction of investment tax credits. 
   
The Basic Model 
There are two goods in the economy, one a tradable consumption good and another a 
non-tradable capital good. For simplicity, the production of the capital good requires only 
labor, so capital is demanded as an input solely by the consumption good sector. There is 
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perfect labor mobility across the two sectors. The production function of the capital good 
is given by zN =εLN, where zN is the output supplied of the capital good, LN  is the number 
of workers employed in the capital goods producing sector, and ε is an effort function 
whose arguments we specify later. Profit maximization by capital goods producing firms 
leads to  
(1) vd =ε pN, 
where v is the real wage measured in terms of the consumption good, our numeraire, and  
pN is the relative price of the capital good. (The superscript “d” denotes the real demand 
wage.) Note that pN is also the real exchange rate. 
 
The production function of the tradable good, a pure consumption good, exhibits constant 
returns to scale and is given by zT = ATF(K,ε LT), where zT is the domestic output of the 
consumption good, K is the stock of capital, LT is the number of workers employed in the 
consumption goods producing sector, and AT is a measure of Hicks-neutral technical 
progress. Competitive hiring of workers leads to  
(2) vd =ε AT[f(K/εLT) - (K/εLT) f’(K/εLT)], 
where f’(K/εLT)>0 and f’’(K/εLT)<0. We suppose that there is an installation cost incurred 
in making capital operational in the consumption goods sector, given by C(I), with 
C’(I)>0 and C’’(I)>0. For simplicity, we assume a quadratic cost function so C(I) = hI2/2, 
h>0. Taking the external real rate of interest as given, perfect international capital 
mobility leads to r = r*, a parameter. Solving the firm’s optimization problem leads to the 
following pair of equations: 
(3) Id = (q – pN)/h, 
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(4) (r*+δ)q = AT f’(K/εLT) + (dq/dt), 
where q is the shadow price of capital, and Id is investment demand. We note from (3) 
that, given q, investment demand is decreasing in pN. An increase in q shifts out the 
investment demand schedule. Equating (1) and (2), we note that K/εLT is a positive 
function of pN/AT, that is, K/εLT = φ( pN/AT), φ’( pN/AT)>0. Substituting this result in (4), 
we get 
(5) (r*+δ)q = AT f’(φ( pN/AT)) + (dq/dt). 
 
Let the fixed size of the labor force be given by L. Then the size of the employed 
workforce is given by (1-u)L, where u is the rate of unemployment. We can express the 
output supply of the capital good as: 
(6) zN = ε(1-u)L – [K/φ( pN/AT)]. 
To determine the equilibrium rate of unemployment, we draw upon a shirking 
formulation of the labor market (Phelps, 1994). Each firm in the economy is assumed to 
choose a wage policy so as to minimize the effective cost, v/ε, where the effort function 
depends negatively on its two arguments: z/v and yw/v. Here, z is the wage expected 
elsewhere, which we take to be equal to (1-u)ve, and yw  is the nonwage income, which 
we take as fixed for a medium-run analysis. Cost minimization by choice of an optimal 
supply wage yields the generalized Solow elasticity condition: 
(7)     1 = -[(ε1/ε)(z/v)+( ε2/ε)( yw/v)]. 
Noting that under a consistent expectations equilibrium, v = ve, using the identity z ≡ (1-
u)ve, and treating yw as fixed, we make the supply wage an increasing function of 1- u, 
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that is, vs = Vs(1-u; yw ), Vs1-u>0. An increase in nonwage income raises the supply wage 
at any given employment rate. Note from (7) that, in equilibrium, we have the following 
restrictions on the partial elasticities: 0<-(ε1/ε)(1-u)<1 and 0<-(ε2/ε)(yw/v)<1. In the 
Marshallian employment—real wage plane, the wage curve is upward sloping. To depict 
the demand wage curve, we note from (1) that given pN, the demand wage declines as 1-u 
increases: 
(8)     dvd/d(1-u) = pNε1/[1+(ε2/ε)(yw/v)]<0 
since around the equilibrium, 0<-(ε2/ε)(yw/v)<1, and ε1<0. The intuition is that as the 
labor market tightens, workers’ work effort declines since they can more readily find 
alternative employment elsewhere in the event that they are caught shirking and are fired. 
So the demand wage curve is downward sloping in the Marshallian employment—real 
wage plane. Juxtaposed against the equilibrium wage curve, the intersection gives the 
pair of equilibrium wage and employment rate. An increase in the relative price of the 
capital good, equivalently a real exchange rate appreciation, shifts up the demand wage 
curve along the given wage curve, and so raises both the real wage as well as the 
equilibrium employment. (It would seem from (2) that at given 1-u, the real demand 
wage depends on both pN and AT. However, since workers are freely mobile across the 
two sectors, an increase in AT would prompt an influx of workers into the tradable sector 
at given pN, thus lowering K/εLT sufficiently to make the labor value marginal product 
unchanged at given pN.) We can write the demand wage as a decreasing function of 1 – u, 
given pN, that is, vd = Vd(1-u; pN), Vd1-u<0. Equating Vs(1-u; yw ) to Vd(1-u; pN), we can 
simply write 1-u = μ( pN;  yw), with 1-u increasing in pN, given yw. 
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We see that when a real exchange rate appreciation occurs, equilibrium employment is 
increased and the real wage rises. In our shirking model, the tighter labor market 
condition can lead to less work effort being exerted as workers reckon that they can more 
readily find alternative employment elsewhere should they be caught shirking and be 
fired. If, however, we suppose that the reduced work effort on account of better 
employment opportunities does not paradoxically cause the total effective workforce to 
decline, then ε(1-u)L will be an increasing function of pN. Using this result in (6), we 
obtain a reduced form expression for the output supply of the capital good: 
(9)     zN = ZN(pN, K; AT), 
where the output supply of the capital good increases in pN, and decreases in K and AT.  
 Equating investment demand given by (3) to the output supply of the capital good given 
by (9), Id = zN: 
(10) (q – pN)/h = ZN(pN, K; AT), 
so q is an increasing function of pN, and a decreasing function of K and AT, q = ϕ( pN, K; 
AT). Alternatively, pN is an increasing function of q, K and AT, pN = ω(q, K; AT). 
The key dynamics of our model can now be represented by the following pair of 
equations: 
(11) dK/dt = ZN(pN, K; AT) - δK, 
(12) ϕ1(dpN/dt) = (r*+δ)ϕ( pN, K; AT) - AT f’(φ( pN/AT)) - ϕ2[ZN(pN, K; AT) - δK], 
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where ϕ1>0, and ϕ2<0. We can check readily that the stationary locus for dK/dt = 0 is 
positively sloped, with a gradient given by 
(13) dpN/dK|KK = [δ - ∂ZN/∂K]/(∂ZN/∂pN)>0. 
The stationary locus for dpN/dt = 0 is also positively sloped, with a gradient given by 
(14) dpN/dK|PP = {[δ - ∂ZN/∂K] + (r*+δ)}/{∂ZN/∂pN + (f’’φ’/ϕ2) – 
((r*+δ)ϕ1/ϕ2)}>0, 
noting that f’’<0, φ’>0, ϕ1>0, and ϕ2<0. For a sufficiently low r*, dpN/dK|PP< dpN/dK|KK, 
and we obtain saddle-path stability, with the unique saddle path being positively sloped 
and having a smaller gradient than the two stationary loci. The phase diagram is shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
We note that it is also possible to develop a phase diagram in the (K, q) plane 
representing the following pair of equations: 
(15) dK/dt = ZN(ω(q, K; AT), K; AT) - δK, 
(16) dq/dt = (r*+δ)q – ATf’(φ(ω(q, K; AT)/AT)). 
 The slope of the K-stationary locus is positive, while the q-stationary locus is negatively 
sloped: 
 dq/dK|KK = [δ - (1 + h∂ZN/∂pN)-1 ∂ZN/∂K]/( ω1∂ZN/∂pN)>0, 
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dq/dK|qq = ω2f’’φ’/[(r*+δ) - ω1f’’φ’]<0, 
where ω1>0 and ω2>0. We obtain a negatively-sloped unique saddle path (see Figure 2). 
Analysis of Shocks 
An anticipation of a future step-increase in AT 
Suppose that at the current moment, t0, economic agents form an expectation that at some 
point in the future, t1, there will be a step increase in AT. In the phase diagram in the (K, 
pN) plane, the stationary locus for dK/dt = 0 shifts to the left as the output supply of the 
capital good is reduced by the increase in AT, as labor is drawn into the tradable sector, 
necessitating an increase in pN to replace depreciation at any K. We can also check that 
the stationary locus for dpN/dt = 0 is shifted leftwards, hence upwards. Hence on impact, 
there is an upward jump of pN, which can be explained as follows: With prospects of a 
higher stream of profits in the future brought about by better technology raising the 
productivity of capital, there is an upward jump of current q, which stimulates investment 
demand. As the supply of capital is not perfectly elastic, there is an upward pressure on 
the relative price of the capital good, which being relatively labor intensive, pulls up the 
demand wage along the given wage curve, and being nontradable, leads to a real 
exchange rate appreciation. The temporarily depressed rental requires an expectation of 
capital gains so q and pN continue to rise between t0 and t1. It is clear that when the 
technology improvement occurs at t1, q cannot jump at that point. So it is pN that must rise 
at that point to reconcile the investment demand to the reduced supply of the capital good 
as workers are released from the capital goods producing sector to the consumer good 
sector. Although the relative price of the capital good is unambiguously increased in the 
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new steady state, there are two possible paths pN could take to reach that steady state: a 
monotonic increase in the one case, incorporating the jump at t1, and an overshooting 
above the steady-state pN in the other case. 
A rise in the external real rate of interest 
An increase in r* leads to a downward shift of the dpN/dt = 0 stationary locus along the 
unshifted dK/dt = 0 locus in Figure 1. There is an immediate drop of  pN followed by a 
steady decline to reach a permanently lower level. The intuition is that the higher 
discount rate applied by managers to evaluate prospective profits causes a fall in q, which 
contracts investment demand. Given an upward-sloping supply curve for capital, there is 
a fall in the relative price of capital, which reduces the demand wage and consequently 
equilibrium employment contracts. 
An introduction of an investment tax credit 
The introduction of an investment tax credit, say at the rate of s, and financed by a lump-
sum tax, makes the relative price of capital faced by the consumer good firm equal to (1- 
s)pN. Equation (3) is now amended to 
      (3’)     Id = [q – (1- s)pN]/h, 
while (10) is amended to 
(10’)     [q – (1- s)pN]/h =  ZN(pN, K; AT), 
so q is an increasing function of pN, and a decreasing function of K, s, and AT, q = ϕ( pN, 
K; AT, s). The introduction of an investment tax credit, therefore, leads to an upward shift 
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of the dpN/dt = 0 stationary locus along the unshifted dK/dt = 0 locus in Figure 1. The 
stimulus to investment demand leads to a rise in the relative price of capital, a real 
appreciation, and an expansion of equilibrium employment. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have drawn together elements of an incentive-wage labor market and an 
assets view of labor demand to show how various shocks in the international economy 
can explain some historical episodes that we argue the Keynesian paradigm cannot 
adequately explain. In our theory, perceptions of a bright future lead to a rise in share 
prices, which in turn stimulate employment without causing inflationary pressures. There 
are various assets that firms are then induced to invest in: the stock of customers both at 
home and overseas, trained employees who need firm-specific training to be fully 
functional, and fixed capital. In this paper, our emphasis has been on the third kind of 
capital---equipment and structures. We combine internal and external adjustment costs to 
generate an explicit firm investment demand function as well as an upward-sloping 
supply curve of capital. The result is a tractable model that can be used to generate useful 
insights into the general-equilibrium workings of an economy in response various 
economic shocks, highlighting the role of asset prices and the real exchange rate in 
determining labor market outcomes. 
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